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Abstract 
 Throughout my research I seek to understand the role projection bias plays within Major 
League Baseball (MLB). Projection bias stems from the field of behavioral economics, which as 
a whole seeks to understand the psychological side of the individual’s economic decision-making 
process. MLB teams have contuinally seeked ways to better analyze the performance of players 
prior to signing them. By limiting projection bias, teams will be able to better allocate their funds 
to players who are most likely to remain consistent or even increase in performance folowing the 
contract. White and Sheldon (2014) show through empirical evidence that MLB players tended 
to increase their performance in the year prior to entering free agency. Their study also 
demonstrated that players tended to decline in performance following their contract. It is possible 
that this phenomenon known as contract theory is a reasoning for the decline in player 
performance; however, General Managers also may be at fault for this occurrence. In my 
research, I analyze players who have signed long-term deals while comparing their statistics pre 
and post contract. My results show which General Managers have been more susceptible to 
projection bias while also discussing the potential causes. 
  
I. Introduction 
In this paper I will seek to answer the following question: Does projection bias play a role in 
a General Manager’s decision making process within Major League Baseball (MLB)? Projection 
bias refers to an individual’s assumption that their tastes and preferences will remain constant 
over time. Within a General Manager’s decision making process, the individual players are those 
who are valued as the tastes and preferences. The threat of projection bias within sports is critical 
as it can save professional teams valuable resources if the bias can be limited in future decisions. 
Professional team owner’s may find this to be of upmost importance when hiring a new General 
Manager, specifically if they are considering someone who has already had a stint in the MLB. 
They will need to gauge whether certain General Managers display this bias in order to have a 
better understanding of who to hire if the position on their team is vacant. Projection bias is 
relevant not only within the MLB, but throughout all major professional sports leagues. 
Ichniowski and Preston (2017) study projection bias within the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) by researching executives. To understand if there is a relevant bias they 
collect data on college basketball players, specifically within the March Madness tournament. 
They conclude that Division I basketball players who perform well within the final tournament, 
known as March Madness, tend to increase their draft stock for the NBA draft. This research is 
relevant to my study as it is the only paper that seeks to understand if upper management in the 
sports world displays projection bias when acquiring new players.  
The role of a General Manager is to sign, trade and release both players and staff involved 
within the organization. It is therefore their job to analyze players’ past performances as a way of 
determining their future value. As a way of analyzing players, it is essential to take into account 
their entire body of work rather than just their recent performances. Following a contract, it may 
be seen through statistics that a player will underperform.  
The purpose of my paper is to determine whether or not a General Manager demonstrates 
projection bias while making decisions upon long-term contracts. In order to do so it will be 
imperative to analyze players’ performances both prior to and following their contracts. A 
player’s decline in play is often considered an underperformance when compared to their 
expected potential, which stems from their previous career performance. To be considered a 
knowledgeable General Manager, one needs to have the ability of predicting whether a player 
will decline in performance, remain consistent, or even outperform their previous career 
statistics. It is without a doubt understood that all great General Managers are capable of making 
mistakes when signing players; however, I seek to understand whether certain General Managers 
have proven to display a pattern of projection bias over a period of many signings.  
The contributions of this work will give the reader an understanding of both how and why 
certain General Managers display projection bias when signing free agents to long-term 
contracts. By analyzing long-term contracts in the MLB, I am able to reveal how projection bias 
when evaluating free agent signings differ drastically from that of drafting players, as shown in 
Ichniowski and Preston’s (2017) study. General Managers are able to accrue data across many 
seasons in order to determine the likelihood of future success for an individual player. When 
drafting players, such as in the NBA, executives are often only given one year of data to interpret 
the best college players as it is often seen that they only play one year at their respective schools. 
This is due to the NBA’s policy that forces potential players to wait one year following the 
graduation of high school. While March Madness serves as the setting for executives to display 
their projection bias, my paper uses short bursts of success in prior seasons along with All-Star 
appearances as a proxy to understand whether projections bias is evident. 
After analyzing the data, it became evident that projection bias was exhibited within the 
signings of MLB players. It was seen that most players had tended to decline in performance 
following the signing of a long-term contract. Many General Managers were seen to sign players 
who had made an appearance in an All-Star game. Some General Managers even tended to 
specifically sign players who had been elected to the All-Star game the direct year prior to 
signing the contract. Brian Cashman in particular signed thirteen total position players to long-
term deals. Ten of those thirteen position players played in an All-Star game the year prior to 
signing a deal. Eight of those ten players then proceeded to decline in performance when 
compared to their previous career statistics. The other two players relatively remained the same. 
This is just one example of projection bias that was evident within MLB General Managers.  
Throughout the remaining paper I will lay out my research on how I came to reveal these 
results. In section two I discuss relevant literature in the fields of projection bias, contract theory, 
as well as decision-making on the General Manager’s part. In section three I break down my 
analytical framework as well as my data collection. I then finalize my discussion by examining 
my results while mentioning potential ideas for future research. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Projection Bias 
In the research paper, Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility by Loewenstein et al. 
(2003), they discuss the role projection bias plays in a variety of economic situations. In Section 
V of their paper, they explain how projection bias can cause the misguided purchases of durable 
goods. The paper notes that people with projection bias are oversensitive to their momentary 
feelings when undergoing purchasing decisions. It is understood that people will over-value 
goods on ‘high-value’ days and undervalue goods on ‘low-value’ days.  
In terms of my research, we can relate this to General Managers in baseball, as they may 
overestimate a player’s abilities based off of a year in which they outperformed their career 
statistics. This season-long performance can be seen as a ‘high-value’ time period for the 
General Manager which sways their decision making when signing a player to a contract. A 
high-value day could also be found in the setting of playoffs as well as games in which the 
General Manager saw the player perform in person. If a player were to perform especially well in 
the playoffs, it is likely going to increase the stock of that player in the General Manager’s mind. 
Despite that playoffs are played in the same manor as regular season games, it is assumed that 
more pressure comes with playing in them. Another factor of the playoffs is that they come 
directly before free agency, which begins directly following the seasons end. Recency bias 
complements projection bias in this particular setting.  
The General Manager’s infatuation for a player, due to what could be short-term success, 
plays a role in their projection of the player’s future success. They often conclude that the burst 
of success will be reflective of their future performance, rather than taking into account the 
player’s career statistics. The paper continues to conclude that people may still abide by 
‘rational’ choices when making one-shot decisions; however, through observations of multiple 
decision-makers it can be seen that people, in fact, show projection bias within their decision 
making process. I will take this into account when analyzing General Managers, as some may 
make a decision that reflects projection bias, however, do not continue to exhibit the same habits. 
Years of data on long-term contracts should allow me to understand whether certain General 
Managers tend to continually display this bias when analyzing free agents.  
In a different setting, Busse et al. (2012) discuss the role projection bias plays in purchasing a 
house or car in their paper, Projection Bias in the Car and Housing Markets. The paper analyzes 
the relationship between the weather or season at the time of a purchase with the change in price 
and use of the house/vehicle purchased. The authors examine over forty thousand vehicle 
transactions and over four million house transactions, while taking into account the weather at 
the time of the purchases. For vehicles, they looked into the purchases of convertibles and four-
wheel drive cars. When examining houses, they looked at those that had swimming pools and 
central air systems. The data significantly proves that consumers are more likely to buy a 
convertible on a summer day. To go along with this finding, they discovered that people are also 
more likely to buy a four-wheel drive car if there is snow or slush on the ground at the time of 
purchase. They also found that houses with swimming pools have higher selling prices in the 
summer months compared to the same house’s selling price during winter months.  
The Busse et al. paper supports my hypothesis due to its examination of projection bias. 
Despite the vast difference in settings, the paper shows a strong correlation to that of my study. 
The authors focus on consumers’ tendencies to over emphasize their current state, specifically 
when considering weather and season when making decisions regarding the purchases of 
vehicles and houses. The findings in this research paper can relate directly to the decision 
making process of a General Manager. A General Manager may often be seen to sign a player 
specifically due to a short period of success, rather than considering the player’s entire career 
performance. Similar to the paper, one can compare the seasons and weather to the ‘burst of 
success’ a player shows. General Mangers may easily show the same biases that everyday people 
show when buying everyday products. The only difference is that General Manager’s decisions 
occur on a more glorified scale. The paper mirrors the theory of General Managers making 
signings without the use of average career statistics, but rather using a more recent sample as a 
justification for signing a player.  
The research paper Weather, Mood, and Use of Antidepressants: The Role of Projection Bias 
in Mental Health Care Decisions (2015) by Tarso Madeira discusses the role of projection bias 
on the effect of mental healthcare decisions. The author looks into the effect of the weather on 
the diagnosis of depression in patients. The analysis goes further to look into the effect of the 
weather on the amount of new prescriptions of antidepressant medication, as well as refilling 
existing prescriptions. The weather that is associated with the antidepressant prescriptions is 
quantified as the the amount of cloud covering, but is also expanded into snow, rain, and 
temperature. The most significant data comes from the winter months, and the stronger of those 
results are in the Northeast and Upper Midwest United States. The findings from Madeira’s 
paper show that the effect of the weather trigger people to feel more depressed than usual, which 
is be seen by their doctors who prescribe antidepressants. The weather influences the patient to 
make less cost-effective decisions, or even lead them to seek treatment when they are not 
depressed or are not in need of treatment.  
The findings of this research paper are significant to General Managers acquisitions of 
players with the assumption that the player is more skilled than they are in reality. General 
Managers will be swayed by the players’ recent history instead of career statistics. There is then 
a tendency to make long term decisions based on the recent history. Projection bias influences 
the General Manager to recall a smaller sample size of history, and therefore make a less 
informed decision. This relates directly back to the patient’s lack of a cost-effective decision 
when when seeking treatment during periods of poor weather conditions. Because a General 
Manger’s role is to make the cost-effective decisions that lead to a successful team it is of 
upmost importance for them to not overvalue recent trends in a players performance. 
Chang et al. (2016) examine projection bias in their research paper Something in the Air: 
Projection Bias and the Demand for Health Insurance. The paper takes an in depth look at the 
effect of air pollution on daily purchasing increases of health insurance policies. They find 
significant data showing that when air pollution is high, individuals are more likely to purchase 
an insurance contract. When air pollution is low and the contract is still within the ten day “regret 
period” after purchase, the likelihood of cancellation is greater. One interesting finding that is 
relevant to my study is that transitional periods showed to have a significant influence on product 
markets. In the case of General Managers, this transitional period can be compared to the ‘burst 
of success’ that players show prior to being signed.  
The Chang et al. paper is similar to my research because it suggests recent history, or in my 
case recent statistics, have a stronger effect on decisions than long term and generally more 
representative information.  General Managers decisions are related to this after a breakout year, 
or an anomaly year, when a player is uncharacteristically better than they have historically been. 
One explanation for the findings in the study is the non-negotiable price of insurance in China, 
where the data was collected. Another limitation of the findings is that some consumer’s 
financial status is unknown; therefore, people may suddenly be able to purchase or realize they 
can’t afford health insurance. This differs from my study, as we are fairly certain of the 
expenditures each team posses coming into each free agent season. Despite the differences, the 
Chang et al. paper contributes to my research and helps to understand the characteristics and 
variables that are valuable within the data collection. 
Contracts in Major League Baseball 
Within the MLB it is important to understand how contracts may play a role in influencing a 
player’s performance. Maxcy et al. (2014) looks into the effect of contracts on MLB players’ 
performance. The main question that the authors sought to answer was whether performance of 
MLB players increased in the year prior to their contract expiring, as well as decreased 
performance after the players have negotiated a new contract. They more heavily investigate the 
“shirking” hypothesis, which refers to a players decrease in effort and is therefore displayed after 
they have negotiated a contract. Past studies looked into the “shirking” hypothesis, but lacked 
comparison of players who act with strategic behavior and those who are in a period when they 
are not projected to shirk. In other words, the authors compare players who are nearing contract 
negotiations and those who are already under contract. From the research, Maxcy et al. (2014) 
found that playing time is higher and players are less likely to end up on the disabled list 
immediately before contract negotiations. It was seen that players are more willing to “gut out” 
smaller injuries at this time, even if it will have a negative impact in the long run. Playing time is 
often higher than average before negotiations because players are trying to enhance their 
bargaining power. By increasing their stock prior to free agency it is likely that a General 
Manger will be forced to commit more money to the player as they are forced to battle other 
General Managers for the player by offering more money. 
The findings of Maxcy et al. are relevant to my paper because it reveals that contract 
negotiations do have an impact on player performance. The paper helps me to understand a 
limitation of my study that is the possibility of a decrease in performance after a contract, instead 
of a return to historical average. Players can have streaks of performance levels and this paper 
helps to realize that in data collection I would need to study players’ patterns to assure their 
actual average performance and therefore confirm the projection bias of the General Manager. 
Keeping in mind the findings of the study, it is imperative to understand that a poor performance 
following a contract is not always due to bad decision-making from the General Manager, rather 
it can also be explained by the player’s intrinsic motivational factors that caused their downturn 
in performance. A copious amount of data will allow me to determine if the General Manager is 
in fact repeatedly making poor decisions or if a few players are the causes to a limited amount of 
underwhelming performances post-contract.  
In a very similar setting, Matthew J. Cahill (2002) sought to investigate the effect of a new 
contract on a player’s production. The question that the paper tried to answer was if a MLB 
player’s performance changed after he signed a long-term contract during his arbitration years. 
Arbitration in the MLB is when players who have been in the league for between three and six 
years, contract expires; therefore, they have the ability to ask their team for a higher salary. MLB 
players do not become a free agent after contract expirations until they have played over six 
years in the league. The arbitration process goes to a panel for moderation and judgment. The 
study looks into whether job security, or lack thereof, is a driving factor in a player’s 
performance. They used the data from thirty MLB position players (non-pitchers) that were 
active at the time and had long-term contracts before 2010. The statistics that were used in the 
study were the following: Slugging Percentage, On Base Percentage, Runs Created, and Batting 
Average on balls in play. These stats were tracked for a six-year window around the signing of 
the long-term contract (three years before the contract and three years after). The results of the 
analysis showed that approximately half of the players had increased performance and the other 
half had decreased performance, while a minority had no change in performance. The findings of 
the paper therefore convey that there was in fact a change in performance following the signing 
of a long-term contract, but there was no distinct result showing whether most players increase or 
decrease performance.  
This paper is relevant to my study because it examined a similar theory, but used different 
statistics. Cahill’s paper left out the use of WAR (Wins Above Replacement), which I see as one 
of the most useful and telling statistics. Another limitation of this study to take into account is 
that there was a small and specific sample size; therefore, the data could be skewed and may not 
be representative of the population as a whole. The study contributes to my paper because it 
shows a limitation of my study in that there can be increases or decreases in players’ 
performance after contracts based on intrinsic motivators. The findings contribute to my research 
topic of exploring General Manager’s projection bias based off of an inconsistent season. The 
paper suggests it is common to have changes in levels of performance surrounding contract 
years, which can have a profound effect on contracts. My research will seek to understand if the 
General Managers in my data collection overvalue these inconsistent seasons.  
White and Sheldon (2014) co-authored a research paper that combines an economical and 
psychological study. They sought to find out how extrinsic factors, like pressure and scrutiny, 
affect players’ motivation and performance in the year leading up to a new contract and the year 
following a new contract. They examined certain periods throughout players’ careers in which 
motivational factors, like a contract year, are particularly salient. One of the main focuses was 
that money is the primary motivator in the year before the new contract was negotiated. They 
sought to measure these extrinsic factors by seeking patterns in performances of players around 
the time of signing a contract.  
The findings from their study were significant because it supports the contract year theory 
that players increase performance when their contract is going to be up for negotiation. They 
found more minor significance in the data they collected from MLB in comparison to the NBA 
data. They found slight decreases depending on the statistic in the years following the contract 
negotiation. One consistency they found in both professional leagues was that an increased 
performance in the year prior to a new contract did increase the player’s salary in the new 
negotiation. Though, the increase in salary had no effect on performance in the year following 
the new contract. The main limitation of this study was the lack of ability to clearly measure 
motivation. White and Sheldon’s (2014) research contributes to my paper because it also 
suggests that players often perform above their career average before they look to engage in 
negotiating a new contract. General Managers show projection bias by relying too heavily on the 
recent statistics of these players. Even though there was less significance found in the MLB, any 
significant statistics of increased performance before a contract can affect the decision making of 
the General Manager. 
General Managers Decision-Making 
Ichniowski and Preston (2017) co-authored an examination of projection bias in March 
Madness in their research paper Does March Madness lead to irrational exuberance in the NBA 
Draft? High-value employee selection decisions and decision-making bias. The paper goes into 
detail regarding the way in which a player’s performance, in terms of terms of team and personal 
success, effect their position in the NBA draft. The performance of the players is then compared 
to their average career statistics.  The authors argue that the March Madness performance is 
weighted too heavily, but it is not irrational. The paper finds significant evidence that players 
performance in March Madness has an impact on their draft position. They also find that there is 
no evidence of players NBA performance being worse after they had changed their draft status 
during March Madness. They also found evidence that a player who experiences an unexpected 
draft bump due to March Madness is more likely to rise to stardom in the NBA.  
This paper ties into my study as it focuses on the projection bias seen during General 
Manager decisions following a major burst in success. Despite that some players’ performance 
begin to rise on average, the decisions made by NBA executives regarding a players’ future can 
be explained by projection bias as it is based on such small, and in certain cases, momentary 
samples of play. The decision making of an NBA General Manager can be directly translated to 
that of an MLB General Manager’s decision making process. Both can be seen making decisions 
based off a player’s burst of success, despite these successes coming in different settings. The 
MLB is more commonly known for being filled with “slumps” and hot streaks by even the best 
players. Baseball is a sport that has an average failure rate of over seventy percent for hitters; 
therefore, there is a need to evaluate players over a longer period of time to assess their skill and 
ability. Unlike collegiate basketball, there is no event in college baseball that is similar to March 
Madness, in its high stakes and intensity, though the College World Series is the closest 
comparison. MLB General Managers are not supplied with a similar arena for viewing and 
evaluation like March Madness; therefore, the projection bias based off of the College World 
Series would have a significantly lower impact than that of March Madness. 
Ichniowski and Preston’s (2017) study has many similarities to mine; however, both the 
setting and empirical research will differ. When evaluating players in college it is important to 
gauge the play of all players as it is primarily dependent on the team’s draft position as to who 
they will end up picking. Because this paper focuses on the drafting side of acquiring players 
rather than the free agent acquisition side it differs greatly in terms of the monetary risks. When 
drafting a player, regardless of the team’s draft position, a team is not so much worried about 
their financial well-being. The risk of missing out on a potential star is a greater threat to NBA 
executives than their need to pay the player they draft. In my study, however, the greatest risk to 
signing a player to a long-term contract is the need to pay them a substantial amount. It is 
important for MLB General Managers to proper allocate their funds in order to maximize their 
team’s ability to find success. This is why understanding and recognizing projection bias is a key 
factor in order to properly manage the organization’s total budget.  
The research paper, Upper Echelons in Professional Sport: The Impact of NBA General 
Managers on Team Performance, by Juravich et al. (2017) examines the influence of General 
Managers on NBA teams. The authors look into decision making by focusing on the General 
Manager’s tenure, functional experience, technical experience, age, and education. Each of these 
characteristics of a General Manager factors into the way he/she shapes their team and therefore 
the major decisions they have to make regarding player contracts. Previous playing experience 
and education are relied on heavily because the authors assume they have some of the largest 
impact on problem solving and strategic approach. The authors use statistics on number of wins 
and the efficiency of wins, calculated by the number of wins in a season divided by the team’s 
payroll.  
Juravich et al’s (2017) paper contributes significantly to my research, but also has various 
limitations. The paper acknowledges that in the NBA not all General Managers are solely in 
charge of acquisitions and the construction of contracts. The study does not examine General 
Manager’s acquisitions specifically, but just the success of their team, which I plan to look at 
more in depth. My paper will look to expand on the research done by Juravich et al. (2017) by 
applying their theories to Major League Baseball. This paper supports my hypothesis that 
General Managers have a profound impact on the team, but I will expand upon it by having a 
larger sample size because of the longer 162 game MLB season. Juravich et al’s (2017) paper 
helps to guide my research in showing me which characteristics of General Manager’s to 
analyze. My hypothesis will work in conjunction with this research paper to prove that projection 
bias plays a large role in the General Manager’s decision making process and therefore the 
success of the team.  
III. Analytical Framework 
In order to establish projection bias among General Managers in the MLB, the performance 
of players will need to be evaluated before and after the signing of a long-term contract. I will 
take into account a player’s career statistics as well as their statistics within the “breakout” 
season and compare them to their performance after receiving the contract. With the use of 
Baseball Reference, I collected data from all players who signed long-term contracts by the 
General Managers that are later mentioned. To understand a player’s career statistics prior to the 
contract, I took data from all years played in the MLB up to that point. For the ‘after’ data, I 
looked at the player’s statistics for the duration of the contract under the team in which the player 
signed with. This ensured that I would only be accounting for the decision making explicitly 
done by the General Manger that executed the signing.  
In the case of my research, a ‘long-term’ contract can be defined as a contract of three or 
more years. White and Sheldon’s (2013) paper discusses the contract year syndrome in both the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) and the MLB. When gathering data, they ensured that 
they had statistics on players for three years prior to and following their contract. This allowed 
for them to capture enough statistics to allow for them to evaluate their hypothesis of a contract 
year syndrome. On a similar note, I need to accumulate enough data both prior to and following 
a contract in order to assess whether certain General Managers exhibit projection bias. In some 
cases, players may get injured in one of their first two seasons. The limited data due to injury 
would therefore not be a fair assessment of the performance over that time period. This is why I 
find it necessary for a long-term contract, in the sense of my research, to be a minimum of three 
years. 
The ten MLB General Managers, along with their respective teams, that I will be examining 
throughout my research are: Mike Rizzo (Washington Nationals), Jon Daniels (Texas Rangers), 
Neal Huntington (Pittsburgh Pirates), Brian Cashman (New York Yankees), Dayton Moore 
(Kansas City Royals), Dave Dombrowski (Florida Marlins, Detroit Tigers, Boston Red Sox), 
Dan Duquette (Montreal Expos, Boston Red Sox, Baltimore Orioles), Doug Melvin (Texas 
Rangers, Milwaukee Brewers), Billy Beane (Oakland Athletics), and John Mozeliak (St. Louis 
Cardinals). Doug Melvin, Billy Beane, and John Mozeliak are the only three General Managers 
from my data set that are currently either retired or hold a different position within Major League 
Baseball. All ten of the listed General Managers have held their position for at least ten years. 
The duration of time for which the General Manager holds the position is important, as it gives a 
deeper understanding of whether they have displayed projection bias. The more data that is 
accrued for each General Manager, the more accurately it will be to analyze my hypothesis. 
There are various other General Managers both current and former that have held the position for 
a lengthy period of time, however,  these ten are the only ones to hold their positions for at least 
ten years within the last two decades. 
To calculate ‘performance’, a variety of statistics will be taken into account. When analyzing 
position players (hitters), I will be looking at the following statistics: batting average (BA), on-
base percentage (OBP), WAR, and All-Star appearances. For BA and OBP, I will be taking the 
players career statistics prior to the signing and compare it to their statistics during the time in 
which they are playing under the long-term contract. Prior to the signing, the player’s BA and 
OBP will be labeled as BAvg and BOBP. The ‘B’ in this case standing for before. The variables 
for the player’s BA and OBP during the long-term contract will be labeled as AAvg and AOBP. 
The ‘A’ in this case standing for after.  
Cahill’s (2014) research looks to understand the change in an MLB player’s performance 
following a long-term deal. To calculate for such performance, Cahill uses OBP and slugging 
percentage as his main statistics to analyze a hitter. The paper only looks at position players; 
however, much of my conceptual framework stems from his way of analysis. To determine 
change in performance he creates a percentage change of each player’s stats prior to and 
following their long-term contract. By doing so he is able to capture whether each player 
declines, improves, or relatively remains the same. My before and after variables stemmed from 
his research as well as my tables which indicate whether a General Manager’s players tended to 
improve, decline, or remain the same in terms of production.   
WAR will be used to understand the performance of both position players and pitchers, and 
therefore will be analyzed the same. The variables will be labeled as B3WAR and A3WAR. 
B3WAR stands for the total WAR in the three years prior to signing the contract, while A3WAR 
stands for the total WAR of the player from the first three years following the contract. A3WAR 
will act as the dependent variable within the regression as I look to understand the causation of 
future performance.  
WAR is a statistic that looks to account for a player’s overall contribution to their team. 
Slowinski (2010) describes WAR as an attempt to understand how much value a team is losing if 
a player were to be removed from the team and an ‘average’ replacement was to be inserted. For 
instance, in 2012 Mike Trout lead the league in WAR with a value of 10.5. Compared to Adrian 
Beltre who in the same year had a WAR of 7.2, you would be able to determine statistically that 
Mike Trout provided more value to his team as he is worth 10.5 more wins to his team. Many 
other pieces of literature that seek to understand player performance within the MLB do not take 
into account WAR. This is primarily due to the fact that WAR has become increasingly popular 
in recent years, so studies that were conducted more than 5 years ago had little to no use of the 
statistic.  
Finally, I look at All-Star Appearances as a metric to possibly identify projection bias from 
the General Managers perspective. The All-Star Game occurs halfway through every MLB 
season. It incorporates the best players from each division, both the American League (AL) and 
the National League (NL).  The players chosen often derive from the votes of fans, coaches, 
players, and the media. It is therefore understood that the best players based on statistics and 
overall performance are often chosen. I find All-Star appearances to be interesting, as they are an 
almost meaningless statistic, however, have the possibility of affecting a General Manager’s 
decisions. Because an All-Star appearance is only based off a player’s statistics from the first 
half of the season, it is not a true indicator of the player’s performance over an entire season. 
This is why I believe some General Managers have a tendency to be over-influenced by players 
who have either made multiple All-Star appearances, or have just been in the All-Star game the 
year prior to signing the contract. I have thus created two variables labeled as ASTotal and 
ASPrior. ASTotal accounts for the total amount of All-Star appearances prior to the signing, 
while ASPrior is a dumy variable that accounts for whether a player was in the All-Star Game 
the direct season prior to signing the long-term contract. Both of these variables will act as 
independent variables within my regression.  
BA is one of the most commonly used statistics when analyzing the performance of a 
player’s offensive abilities. The accumulation of the player’s batting average throughout the 
extent of the long-term contract will be one of my independent variables for the regression and is 
labeled as AAvg. The stat calculates a percentage of how many times a player is able to get a hit 
when compared to how many total at-bats the player has over the same time span. OBP is also a 
heavily used metric in baseball for hitters. The statistic calculates how often a player is able to 
reach base out of all the plate appearances they may have. Reaching base is defined as getting a 
hit, walking, or getting hit by a pitch. This metric is relevant, as reaching base is a major 
component of success for not only that player but the team as a whole. It will also be an 
independent variable within my regression and labeled as AOBP.  
When analyzing pitchers, I will be taking the following statistics into account: earned run 
average (ERA), walks and hits per innings pitched (WHIP), WAR, and All-Star appearances. 
WAR and All-Star appearances will be calculated the same way it was for hitters. For both ERA 
and WHIP, I will take the player’s career statistics based on both these metrics leading up to the 
contract and compare it to that of their statistics following the long-term contract. The variables 
for prior to the contract will be labeled as BERA and BWHIP. The variables used to analyze the 
statistics following the contract will be labeled as AERA and AWHIP. Both BERA and BWHIP 
will be used as independent variables in my study when running the regression.  
Using the statistics previously mentioned, I will be able to develop a baseline of career 
performance for each player involved in the data set. When analyzing the data set I will seek to 
compare each player’s performance in years following their contract to their respective baseline 
as well as their “breakout” season. This will enable me to develop an understanding of changes 
in performance as well as the success of the General Manager’s decision making process. For 
this study I hypothesize that General Managers exhibit projection bias due to the increased 
performance of players within years prior to contract negotiations. 
I plan to be mindful of the age by at which the player is signed in order to limit any errors 
within the study. I expect that younger players who sign a long-term deal are more likely to 
perform positively compared to players nearing the end of their careers. This is likely due to the 
motivation a younger player has to prove his overall worth moving forward in his career. 
Krautmann (2009) discusses this in his paper in which he argues that players who are less likely 
to sign a subsequent contract have a large statistically significant reduction in performance 
compared to expectations. The reasoning for this is that younger players, despite potentially 
already being in a long-term deal, have the ability to obtain another significant contract later on 
in their career. In contrast to younger players, older players are likely less motivated as they 
understand that they are extremely unlikely to receive another long-term contract. In this case, 
the only extrinsic motivational factors would be career statistics in order to formulate a case for 
the Hall of Fame and production for team success.  
A second way I seek to understand my hypothesis is by analyzing the decisions of General 
Managers over periods of time. It can be seen that it is possible for General Manager’s to make 
irrational decisions that display projection bias, but do not consistently display this bias 
throughout their career. I incorporate all long-term decisions that each of the General Managers 
in the data set have made over his career up to this point. By doing so it will allow me to gain 
enough data on each manager so that it can be determined whether or not they may display 
projection bias. By analyzing a General Manager’s tendencies, I can assess whether or not they 
were able to realize their mistakes by not committing a similar mistake in the future. If General 
Manager’s show that they are prone to signing players who have one notable year then it is likely 
that I can attest this behavioral pattern to projection bias.  
IV. Empirical Evidence 
With my data set that I have collected and previously described in detail, I ran a few 
regressions to help understand the impact that relevant statistics and All-Star appearances have 
on future performance. To capture ‘future performance’ as a whole I have chosen WAR in the 
three years following the long-term contract to encapture the overall performance each player 
displays. The multi-variate model for both pitchers and position players can be seen below. 
 
Position Players: 
𝐴3𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝐵0 +  𝐵1𝐵𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑖 +  𝐵2𝐵𝑂𝐵𝑃𝑖 +  𝐵3𝐴𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 +  𝐵4𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 +  𝐵5𝐵3𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝐸𝑖 
Pitchers: 
𝐴3𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝐵0 +  𝐵1𝐵𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑖 + 𝐵2𝐵𝑊𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑖 +  𝐵3𝐴𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 +  𝐵4𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝐵5𝐵3𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖 +  𝐸𝑖 
 
 In both equations, I am testing to understand if previous career statistics along with All-
Star appearnaces have any affect on future performance. It will be important to gauge All-Star 
appearances in particular, as I believe that it is a specific statistic that General Mangers tend to 
over-emphasize when evaluating a player. Data on ERA, WHIP, Batting Average, and OBP are 
all taken from the total years prior to the signing of a long-term contract. The total All-Star 
appearances variable accounts for all years that the player made the All-Star game, while the 
variable for All-Star appearnaces prior only accounts for whether the player made an appearance 
the direct year prior to signing the contract. I expect to find this variable to be particularly 
important as projection bias would note that this prolific play would cause the General Manager 
to expect this exact play for years to come. In addition to these variables I included the variable 
for total WAR the three years prior to signing the contract in order to account for performance 
prior to signing the contract. I use B3WAR as a control variable in the model as a way of clarify 
the relationship between A3WAR and my other dependent variables.  
Based on the results, we can see in Table 1 that batting average before the long-term deal 
along with All-Star appearances the year prior to the deal have the largest positive impact on 
future performance (A3WAR). Despite it’s impact on future performance, the variable for All-
Star appearances the year prior is the only variable that does not show any level of significance. 
BAvg along with the control variable, B3WAR, are significant at the 1% level. Both OBP before 
the long-term signing as well as total All-Star appearances show to have a negative impact on 
future performance. The significance of BAvg was expected as White and Sheldon (2013) note 
in their research that many prominent offensive statistics including BA play an incrumental role 
in determining the future success of a payer, specifically in contract years. This data also 
displays that it may tend to be important for General Manger’s to consider a player who just 
made an All-Star game with high regard. This is important when we look at the changes in 
performance of players signed by each General Manager.  
 When looking at the second regression in Table 2 that looks to understand future 
performance of pitchers, we can see a number of results. All dependent variables show to have a 
positive affect on A3WAR except WHIP. The cotrol variable, B3WAR, which takes into account 
an accumulation of performance the three years prior to signing the long-term contract, is the 
only variable that shows any significance. B3WAR is significant at the 1% level. The results for 
pitchers differed from hitters, as it is seen that All-Star appearances prior plays a larger role 
when analyzing a hitters future success than that of an All-Star appearance the year prior to a 
long-term deal for a pitcher. General Managers may limit projection bias by analyzing not only a 
players career statistics to the fullest, but also looking at their total All-Star appearances as it 
may show the reliability of a pitcher throughout his career.  
 With any study there are limitations that are involved that can have an impact on the 
understanding of my hypothesis. The first limitation is the number of total General Managers 
that implement long-term signings throughout their careers. There are ten total General Mangers 
in my study. I chose these ten General Managers based on the following criteria: have been in the 
General Manger role for at least ten years, started their role after 1995. There were ten total 
General Managers that met these pieces of criteria, however, not all of them tend to use long-
term signings throughout their tenure. Those who tend to not use long-term signings show to be a 
slight difficulty within my study. Because I am only looking at long-term signings it is hard to 
identify whether or not those General Managers who do not implement long-term signings 
exhibit projection bias. For my study I plan on still including these managers and their limited 
long-term signings as they still may offer data that is relevant. Whether or not a General 
Manager performs limited long-term acquisitions, it is still important to include their data as it is 
a different style of contract negotiations that is used within the MLB.  
A second limitation that displayed itself throughout data collection is that some players 
sign a long-term deal of three years and end up either getting released or traded in the third year 
of their contract. When collecting data, I decided that it is important to include these players as 
many of these signings tend to show that the General Manager made a poor decision and likely 
show some resemblance of projections bias. For the data collection, I included the data of these 
players in the two years following the contract along with the partial data they have in the third 
year of which they were released or traded. Although the contract was not enacted for the full 
extent, the partial data is important in understanding how the player performed prior to signing 
the contract when comparing it to their career statistics. 
A third limitation I discovered when collecting the data was the signing of players who 
did not have experience in the MLB. One example of this is right-handed pitcher Yu Darvish. 
Darvish was signed out of the Japanese professional baseball league where he found success. Yu 
Darvish was signed to a six-year deal by the Texas Rangers without any prior experience in the 
MLB. General Manager Jon Daniels signed Darvish as he showed tremendous talent out of the 
Japanese league. Statistics on career performance within the MLB was therefore not available for 
collection. Despite not being included within the data set, I believe it is still important to 
understand that signings like these occur somewhat regularly by General Managers across the 
MLB. 
Another limitation I recognize is that player’s may experience intrinsic motivational 
factors. Discussed in the study by Maxcy et al. (2014), they mention a potential “shirking” 
hypothesis. This hypothesis refers to a player’s decrease in performance following the 
negotiation of a new contract. This shows that in some cases the player may be intrinsically 
motivated in ways that decrease their performance, which in turn do not reflect the decision 
making process of a General Manager. This limitation also ties in the fact that player injuries 
may occur following the signing of a long-term contract. If a player were to acquire an injury in 
the year following the signing of their contract, it will likely result in a decrease in performance. 
An injury is a factor that General Managers do not have the ability of predicting; thus, they 
cannot be held accountable for.  
A final limitation present in my study is the potential for limited options in the free 
agency market. The free agent market can be defined as players who are not currently signed to a 
contract on an MLB team and are therefore looking to be signed by a franchise. It is possible that 
in a given year a team may be on the hunt for a particular position to fill within their team roster. 
In the given year, there may be limited options in terms of available players at that certain 
position, thus giving the General Manager little to no option when attempting to fill the position. 
While signing a player in these circumstances may display projection bias, it is also essential to 
understand the limited choices the General Manager was given.  
 To account for limitations within my data I ran a Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test to 
account for heteroskedasticity. For both regressions, I failed to reject the null hypothesis. For the 
linear regression run with the data of the position players, I received a p-value of 0.716. For the 
linear regression for the pitchers, I received a p-value of 0.9743. I also ran an rvfplot to account 
for heteroskedasticity. Each plot, one for the position players and one for the pitchers, can be 
seen under graphs five and six. Neither graph displays any sort of pattern, thus confirming any 
concerns about heteroskedasticity.  
 With the data collected from seasons prior and following the contract, I found it 
imperative that change in terms of percentages would be important when understanding a 
General Manager’s projection bias. In Table 7 you can see every general Manager I studied to go 
along with every long-term signing they made as a General Manager before the start of the 2016 
season. It is clear that different General Managers have different strategies, as some have shown 
to sign many players to long-term deals while others tend to rarely sign a player for more than 
two years. This is one limitation to my study as there is limited data on those who tended to 
implement few long-term signings throughout their careers as General Manager. The percent 
change was calculated by taking into account all statistics by the player (including WAR), in 
order to understand the difference in performance following the signing of a long-term deal. In 
each table, there is a column for whether the long-term signing improved, declined or remained 
the same. A decline or increase in performance can be seen if the player’s performance is 5% 
lower or higher, respectively, compared to their previous career statistics. Therefore, players who 
are categorized as remaining the same after the contract signing declined or increased in 
performance within the 5% level (-5%<p<5%).  
We can see that Brian Cashman made the most long-term transactions. This is not surprising 
as he has been the General Manager for the New York Yankees since 1998. The Yankees have 
shown to have the highest payroll in baseball almost every year since as they have the highest 
valued team in the MLB. Schmidt and Schreiber (2008) note that for the 2009 season the 
Yankees occupied the four largest contracts in baseball which included: Mark Teixeira, Derek 
Jeter, Alex Rodriguez, and C. C. Sabathia. The article also discusses the fact that Yankees are at 
a significant advantage due to their, almost unlimited, expenditures. Because there is no salary 
cap in baseball, a team such as the Yankees has the ability to sign significantly more high-value 
players, which is clearly seen within my data.  
The results for Brian Cashman show that despite the number of long-term signings, many of 
the players declined after their contract. 14 out of the 20 long term signings showed to decline (at 
least 5%). We can see that Brian Cashman displays projection bias in some sense as 11 out of the 
20 signings had made the All-Star Game the year prior to signing. For position players in 
particular, Cashman signed 10 players out of his 13 total that were in the All-Star Game the year 
before being signed. This could be a sign that the player is in fact a valuable asset; however, it 
could stem from a bias that Cashman shows towards those involved in All-Star Games. Based on 
the number of declining players we can likely attest the overall change in performance of the 
players to the projection bias exhibited by Brian Cashman. 
Many General Mangers tend to have players who decline following a long-term contract. 
This shows that it’s possible that making long-term acquisitions are not always the greatest 
financial move for the organization. The decisions of General Managers are often scrutinized as 
they play a fundamental role in the success of a team; however, it is important to keep in mind 
that a player is the one with the ability to change their performance not the General Manager 
himself.  
V. Conclusion 
Throughout the structure of this paper I seek to understand whether projection bias is evident 
in General Managers within the MLB. To help me understand this hypothesis I collected a series 
of data that consisted of player performances, in terms of statistics, both prior to and following 
the signing of a long-term contract. The research sought to understand not only whether 
projection bias was evident, but if there was a clear method of understanding whether certain 
General Managers displayed this bias through a compilation of long-term deals. I found that 
projection bias was likely evident in a set of MLB General Managers; however, it could not be 
concluded that all of them exhibited this bias due to limited signings by some teams. As a final 
result, I can clearly note that All-Star appearances play an influential role in the causation of 
projection bias within the realm of the MLB.  
My paper poses many potential contributions to current literature. One contribution is the 
understanding of a General Manager’s decision making process. There have been limited studies 
within this field of research, especially within the context of the MLB. By analyzing General 
Manager’s decision making I have been able to determine the effectiveness of particular General 
Manager’s within the MLB. This allowed for me to understand possible tactics that successful 
General Manager’s implement when acquiring players. The study will also help in the hiring 
process of General Manager’s by the team owners. The results will be particularly useful for 
owners as they will get an understanding of which General Manager’s are more likely to make 
rewarding decisions based on their behavioral decision making. Another contribution my study 
exhibits is the use of WAR. As previously mentioned, this statistic has become increasingly 
popular over recent years and is a valuable statistic when understanding both a player’s 
performance as well as their value to a team. By including WAR, I believe I can track a more 
accurate representation of a player’s performance, which will in turn allow me to better 
understand the efficiency of the General Manager’s decision making process. 
 There are a few directions for potential future research. One direction would be staying 
within the field of professional baseball. By doing so, I would look to collect data on other 
potential causes of projection bias. One example of this could be the playoffs. By including 
playoff data, the study could look to understand a different causation of projection bias within 
MLB General Managers. A second direction to take with this study would be to analyze 
projection bias in a different professional sports setting. Projection bias will most definitely be 
evident within all major professional sports leagues. By performing the study within different 
settings, one could get an understanding of how different sports leagues may have different 
causations for projection bias. Because many professional sports are likely to incorporate some 
level of projection bias, it is vital to get an understanding of how each bias differs in each sport. 
Despite any differences, all research will seek to understand how General Managers may allocate 
their funds more efficiently.   
VI. Tables 
Table 1.  
Position Players Regression Outcome 
Linear Regression 
A3WAR Coef. St. Err. t-value p-value [95% conf Interval] Sig. 
BAvg 213.341 57.036 3.74 0.001 97.163 329.519 *** 
BOBP -83.321 41.130 -2.03 0.051 -167.100 0.458 * 
ASTotal -0.572 0.274 -2.09 0.045 -1.129 -0.015 ** 
ASPrior 2.632 1.654 1.59 0.121 -0.737 6.000  
B3WAR 0.615 0.156 3.95 0.000 0.298 0.932 *** 
Constant -29.949 13.367 -2.24 0.0032 -57.176 -2.723 ** 
 
Table 2. 
Pitchers Regression Outcome 
Linear Regression 
A3WAR Coef. St. Err. t-value p-value [95% conf Interval] Sig. 
BERA 1.713 3.151 0.54 0.591 -4.741 8.166  
BWHIP -4.403 16.588 -0.27 0.793 -38.383 29.577  
ASTotal 0.488 0.526 0.93 0.362 -0.590 1.566  
ASPrior 0.011 2.268 0.01 0.996 -4.636 4.657  
B3WAR 0.724 0.184 3.92 0.001 0.346 1.102 *** 
Constant 0.004 12.641 0.00 1.000 -25.891 25.899  
 
Table 3. 
Position Players VIF Outcome 
VIF 1/VIF 
BAvg             2.52 0.396 
BOBP            2.48 0.404 
B3WAR        1.78 0.561 
ASTotal         1.74 0.574 
ASPrior         1.64 0.610 
Mean VIF      2.03 
 
 
 
Mean dependent var. 7.758 SD dependent var. 6.100 
R-squared 0.635 Number of obs. 38.000 
F-test 11.158 Prob > F 0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 217.909 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 227.734 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Mean dependent var. 6.012 SD dependent var. 5.224 
R-squared 0.521 Number of obs. 34.000 
F-test 6.082 Prob > F 0.001 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 194.895 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 204.053 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Table 4. 
Positions Players VIF Outcome 
VIF 1/VIF 
BWHIP          6.99 0.143 
BERA            6.66 0.150 
B3WAR        1.59 0.629 
ASTotal         1.98 0.0.506 
ASPrior         1.18 0.0.849 
Mean VIF      3.68 
 
 
Graph 5.  
Heteroskedasticity Test for Position Players 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6. 
Heteroskedasticity Test for Pitchers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. (Starting on next page) 
Change in Performance of Players who Signed Long-Term Contracts (Broken Down by each 
General Manager) 
H=Position Player, P=Pitcher 
 
Mike Rizzo 
Players Who Improved 
Player                            % Change 
Daniel Murphy (H)       63.31% 
Max Scherzer (P)          29.30% 
Shawn Kelley (P)          57.38% 
 
 
Players Who Declined 
Player                            % Change 
Jayson Werth (H)        -18.12% 
 
Players Who Remained the Same 
Player                               % Change 
N/A 
  
Jon Daniels 
Players Who Improved 
Player                            % Change 
Adrian Beltre (H)         10.22% 
 
Players Who Declined 
Player                            % Change 
Shin-Soo Choo (H)       -26.47% 
Kevin Millwood (P)     -26.84% 
Vicente Pedilla (P)      -29.93% 
 
Players Who Remained the Same 
Player                               % Change 
Frank Catalanotto (H)   -1.84% 
  
Neal Huntington 
Players Who Improved 
Player                            % Change 
N/A 
 
Players Who Declined 
Player                            % Change 
N/A 
 
Players Who Remained the Same 
Player                               % Change 
Francisco Liriano (P)      -1.95% 
  
Brian Cashman 
Players Who Improved 
Player                            % Change 
Mike Stanton (P)         27.64% 
Mariano Rivera (P)      23.66% 
 
Players Who Declined 
Player                            % Change 
Scott Brosius (H)          -25.45% 
Jason Giambi (H)         -23.30% 
Gary Sheffield (H)        -17.49% 
Jorge Posada (H)         -30.76% 
Álex Rodríguez (H)      -19.61% 
Mark Teixeira (H)        -16.34% 
Derek Jeter (H)            -31.33% 
Brian McCann (H)       -14.21% 
Jacoby Ellsbury (H)     -20.62% 
Carlos Beltran (H)       -30.24% 
Chase Headley (H)      -22.90% 
Carl Pavano (P)            -38.71% 
Kyle Farnsworth (P)    -5.67% 
A.J. Burnett (P)            -24.92% 
 
 
Players Who Remained the Same 
Player                               % Change 
Bernie Williams (H)        2.09% 
Johnny Damon (H)         -3.37% 
Mike Mussina (P)            3.95% 
CC Sabathia (P)                -4.74% 
  
Dayton Moore 
Players Who Improved 
Player                            % Change 
Gil Meche (P)               181.01% 
Ian Kennedy (P)           778.21% 
 
 
Players Who Declined 
Player                            % Change 
José Guillén (H)            -49.77% 
Omar Infante (H)         -44.91% 
Alex Gordon (H)           -34.31% 
Jeremy Guthrie (P)      -19.49% 
Jason Vargas (P)           -12.05% 
 
Players Who Remained the Same 
Player                               % Change 
N/A 
  
Dave Dombrowski 
Players Who Improved 
Player                            % Change 
Victor Martinez (H)     13.49% 
Joaquin Benoit (P)       76.98% 
 
 
Players Who Declined 
Player                            % Change 
Iván Rodríguez (H)       -8.01% 
Alex Fernandez (P)      -14.26% 
Aníbal Sánchez (P)       -5.37% 
David Price (P)              -16.70% 
 
 
 
 
Players Who Remained the Same 
Player                               % Change 
Magglio Ordóñez (H)     0.05% 
  
Dan Duquette 
Players Who Improved 
Player                            % Change 
Tim Wakefield (P)        151.02% 
Darren O’Day (P)          8.16% 
 
 
 
Players Who Declined 
Player                            % Change 
Darren Lewis (H)          -13.12% 
José Offerman (H)       -18.55% 
Chris Davis (H)              -42.26% 
Bret Saberhagen (P)    -14.95% 
Ubaldo Jiménez (P)      -26.80% 
 
 
 
 
Players Who Remained the Same 
Player                               % Change 
Jeff Frye (H)                     -1.04% 
Manny Ramírez (H)        -1.23% 
Johnny Damon (H)         -0.74% 
Tom Gordon (P)               3.54% 
  
Doug Melvin 
Players Who Improved 
Player                            % Change 
Aramis Ramírez (H)     28.85% 
John Wetteland (P)     11.72% 
 
 
Players Who Declined 
Player                            % Change 
Mark McLemore (H)    -8.36% 
Damian Miller (H)        -17.06% 
Kenny Rogers (P)         -7.51% 
Jeff Suppan (P)             -38.13% 
David Riske (P)             -57.73% 
Randy Wolf (P)             -22.77% 
Matt Garza (P)             -46.72% 
 
 
 
 
Players Who Remained the Same 
Player                               % Change 
Rafael Palmeiro (H)        -1.49% 
Álex Rodríguez (H)          4.12% 
  
Billy Beane 
Players Who Improved 
Player                            % Change 
Gil Heredia (P)              175.25% 
 
 
Players Who Declined 
Player                            % Change 
John Jaha (H)                -9.69% 
Mike Magnante (P)     -12.33% 
 
 
Players Who Remained the Same 
Player                               % Change 
N/A 
  
John Mozeliak 
Players Who Improved 
Player                            % Change 
Randy Choate (P)         8.24% 
 
Players Who Declined 
Player                            % Change 
Matt Holiday (H)          -10.44% 
 
 
Players Who Remained the Same 
Player                               % Change 
Jhonny Peralta (H)         -3.93% 
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